Jeudi 15 mai 2008
New article: Legacy of Ashes: the guardians of the infamous "mystery"
of Little Bighorn want to be celebrated as the "next generation" of Custer's students
custerwest.org new video
INSPIRATION
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version 2.0 ready - open the History Portal
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Mardi 13 mai 2008
How could Custer have known Benteen would not be along- EVER?
NO SUPPORT EVER
Excerpt from E. Lisle Reedstrom, Custer's 7th Cavalry: From Fort Riley to the Little Big
Horn, 1992, pages 140-146; Edited by Custerwest.org member, Jeff Veach.
Excerpt from E. Lisle Reedstrom, Custer's 7th Cavalry: From Fort Riley to the
Little Big
Horn, 1992, pages 140-146; Edited by Custerwest.org member, Jeff Veach.
"The key to the disaster... was due to the actions, or rather, the lack thereof of Captain Frederick William
Benteen..."
Probably, it was Custer's original intention after sending Reno across the Little Big Horn to march along its bluffs until he found a practicable ford for attacking the hostile's
encampment from the flank.
It wasn't until he actually sighted the vast aggregation of tipis that he realized what he was up against. True, he knew from experience a large village was just as apt to disperse as a small
one. But, for once in his life, at least, Custer had decided to play it safe. He had send a message back to Benteen (Captain Frederick W. Benteen) ordering him to bring up the regiment's reserve
ammunition packs.
"BENTEEN: COME ON. BIG VILLAGE. BE QUICK. BRING PACKS. W.W. COOKE.
P.S. BRING PACKS."
He would wait for them before attacking, fighting a holding action in the meantime. The 7th's senior Captain would be along shortly (Trumpeter John Martini, who rode back
to Benteen, carrying Custer's
famous "last message," evidently failed to inform Benteen of Custer's last known position. Instead of moving across country in his direction, Benteen kept on line of Reno's advance).
Granted, all of this may be considered conjectural. But, it is based upon known facts. With this in mind, we may legitimately conjecture Custer and his battalion did fight
a holding action until near the end of the battle, expecting Benteen to appear any minute with the regiment's reserve ammunition. It may well be this was a fatal mistake.
But how could Custer have known Benteen would not be along- EVER?
But what if Custer had not elected to play it safe? What if he had charged across the river into the hostile encampment? There were then few warriors to contest his crossing. This is one
piece of Indian testimony we can safely rely on. Wouldn't there have been confusion compounded among the warriors still in it? The troopers would have been shooting, yelling, blowing bugles,
setting fire to every tipi within reach, while women, children and old people would have been running helter-skelter, screaming at the top of their voices, getting in each
others way and that of the few warriors present, dogs barking and howling, ponies rearing and neighing. The warriors streaming back from Reno would only have added to the confusion, dust and
smoke obscuring
everything. In short, it would have been one helluva donnybrook, a la GarryOwen! Even if Custer and his battalion had still died with their boots on, to a man.
Let us try to re-construct the actions at the Little Big Horn, from recent material gathered, basing facts originating from various authentic sources presented.
Custer turned his battalion away from the river to the prominence now known as Custer Hill, on which the monument stands. Here he dismounted his men, every fourth trooper
being a horse-holder. There was little cover, but they wouldn't have to fight a holding action for very long. Benteen would soon be along with the regiment's reserve ammunition. A long range
sniping contest then ensued. The hostiles, now gathering in full force, were also dismounted, their cover much better than that of the troopers. Armed mostly with bows and arrows they kept up a
continual arcing shower of barbed shafts upon the pony soldiers, causing considerable casualties.
Galling though it was, the troopers stood in manfully. Benteen would be along soon. As the minutes slowly ticked by Custer was continually scanning with his field glasses,
the direction in which he expected Benteen to appear. He hadn't sent him that far on the scout to the left of the 7th's line of march! He was only to find the valley of the Little Big Horn,
"which was supposed to be nearby and to pitch into anything" he might find. It was evident he hadn't found anything "to pitch into". Custer had!
Custer focused his field glasses on what afterward came to be known as Weir Point. Movement could be seen on it even through the dust and smoke on Custer Hill, flashes of blue, of sunlight
striking metal. By God! There was one of the 7th's guidons! Benteen at last!
Swiftly Custer decided he must open a corridor for Benteen. Calling his officers around him, he ordered his brother Captain Tom Custer (Company C) and Lieutenant A.E.
Smith (Company E) to take their companies down Custer Hill to the southeast. Then he ordered Captain Myles Keogh (Company I) and his brother-in-law Lieutentant James Calhoun (Company L) to take
three companies along what is now known as Battle Ridge to the east of his command post, Calhoun diverging onto a ridge to the southeast.
Some men, we do not know how many, Custer kept with him at this command post. Taking up their assigned positions, Tom Custer, Smith, Keogh and Calhoun prepared to
facilitate Benteen's arrival, expected momentarily. At his command post Custer anxiously scanned Weir Point for movement toward him. There was none! It looked like the troops on Weir Point were
retreating instead of coming forward.
Tom Custer and Smith from their positions below Custer Hill could see nothing of this. They only knew there was no indication of Benteen's coming. They were under a
galling fire, men were falling right and left, they couldn't hold their ground any longer. Trying to beat a hasty retreat back to the command post, most of the two companies were lost, a host of
warriors under Lame White Man, seeing their chance, engulfing them in a red wave. Tom Custer and Smith and a handful of their men made it back to the comparative safety of the command post. They
would live a little while longer.
Keogh and Calhoun found themselves in the same predicament. Both had dismounted their men upon taking their assigned positions, every fourth man a horse-holder. They, too,
had come under a fierce fire with no sign of Benteen. It is evident from the positions of Calhoun and his men, as their bodies were found afterward, they had held a skirmish line to the end, the
only such line to be found on Custer Field. Calhoun had once written his brother-in-law if ever the latter had need of him he would no be found wanting. Calhoun certainly kept this promise!
Possibly, seeing Benteen wasn't coming he had determined to give Custer every chance, no matter have slim, to save what was left of the battalion. We do not know whether he advised Keogh of what
we presume to have been his decision, or whether he would have been able to do so. In any case, it is evident from hostile testimony and the positions of the bodies of Keogh and his men, the
fighting Irishman tried to lead a retreat back to the command post, but they were wiped out en route. Calhoun and his command had probably fallen to the last man before this.
Custer now had only about 40 officers and men left at the command post, most of them perhaps wounded. Probably, he had seen the slaughter of Keogh's and Calhoun's commands
through his field-glasses. For
whatever reason, Benteen had not come. It was all too apparent "Custer's Luck" had run out! He now realized he and the remanent of his battalion were doomed.
All that was left for them was to sell their lives as dearly as possible. For their part, the hostiles could see this last portion of pony soldiers could also be wiped out
to a man with small loss to themselves. All they had to do was to worm their way closer and closer from cover to cover, picking off these enemies by ones, twos and threes, until a
mounted charge could over-run the very few left.
This they proceeded to do. According to hostile testimony, only seven troopers managed to evade the final onslaught, making a futile break for the Little Big Horn. They were swiftly ridden down,
being tomahawked, lanced or shot in their tracks. It was all over. "We have killed them all!" Again all of this may be considered as conjecture. But it is logical, being based upon the few
new facts we admittedly possess.
We know the terrain of Custer Field, which hasn't changed much since 1876. We know a person using field glasses can easily descry Weir Point from Custer Hill and anything appearing upon it. We
know the Indian method of fighting. Some Indian testimony, after the wheat has been separated from the chaff, rings true. The same may be said for much of the 7th's survivors testimony at the
Reno Court of Inquiry in 1879.
There are certain things that are evident of themselves. It is evident from Custer's last order to Benteen, the famous "Bring packs," he had decided to fight a holding
action until the 7th's senior captain joined him with the ammunition packs. It is evident he knew Benteen could join him in a short time. It must have been evident to Custer most if not all of
the hostiles had concentrated against him.
Therefore, either Reno had been wiped out or his own appearance across the Little Big Horn from their encampment had diverted their attention from the Major to himself. Probably Custer thought
the last assumption to be the correct one. Benteen, then, could pick up Reno's battalion and hurry with it and his own and the ammunition packs to join him. As we have pointed out, Custer must
had seen the appearance of the rest of the 7th through his field glasses in Weir Point. It is evident Benteen must have though so, since he testified at the Reno Court he had
one of the 7th's guidons planted there so Custer would know where the rest of the regiment was. He could then fight his way through to it. Still, it must also have been evident to Benteen from
the "Bring packs" order Custer expected him to do just the opposite. Therefore, Benteen was to join Custer, not the other way 'round.
In the event, what would have been more logical for Custer than to have ordered the troop dispositions we have conjectured he did in order to facilitate Benteen's arrival.
In this we agree with the late Dr. Kuhlman (Custer and the Gall Saga; Billings, Mont., 1940. Legend into History; The Custer Mystery; Harrisburg, Pa., Stackpole Co., 1951). In
any case, the positions where the bodies of Tom Custer's, Smith's, Keogh's and Calhoun's men were found bears this out. Unless we accept Benteen's wholly untenable theory it was all
"panic-rout."
Despite the faulty cartridge ejection of most of the 7th's weapons, the troopers were far better armed than the hostiles. Consequently the 7th's firepower was much
greater. We may be sure the hostiles were well
aware of this fact, acting accordingly, utilizing every bit of cover available to them, exposing themselves very little. As an inspection of the whole terrain of Custer Field shows, the Custer
battalion was for more exposed. But, Custer didn't expect his holding action to last very long. Therefore he expected his casualties to be light.
It is only logical to assume if he had not seen the rest of the 7th on Weir Point, deducing therefrom the swift arrival of Benteen, he would have sought a better defensive
position he could hold for any length of time necessary, or as long as his ammunition held out. It does seem to us this may have been the crux of the matter. From Indian testimony it is evident
the hostiles were successful in stampeding most of the 7th's mounts, their saddle-bags carrying most of the troopers ammunition. This happended after Custer had made the troop dispositions we
have
recounted. Did Tom Custer's, Smith's, Keogh's and Calhoun's men run out of ammunition after their horses stampeded? How long the Custer battalion's ammunition would have lasted if he had sought a
better
defensive position and had simply sat tight with his whole battalion it is impossible to say.
The hostiles would still have tried to stampede the pony soldier's mounts. But it is doubtful if they would then have
been successful, for Custer would have done his utmost to safeguard the precious ammunition reserve he had with him.
Whether Custer could have held out as long as Reno and Benteen is a good question. However, until he had made the troop dispositions we have recounted, the battle, if it could be so termed,
had been a long-drawn-out sniping contest, as was most of the Reno-Benteen engagement on Reno Hill. This did not use up much ammunition. It is possible Custer might have held out until the
arrival of Terry and Gibbon. We know Reno and Benteen did.
We also know the hostiles made no all-out effort to overrun the Reno-Benteen positions. In fact, they didn't even try to wipe out Reno when he made his sauve qui peut
(Save himself who can) to the bluffs from his position in the timber. This they could easily have done, incurring very few casualties themselves. They merely seemed content to
have driven Reno away from proximity to their encampment. Of course, at the same time Custer was making his appearance opposite their encampment, which probably drew the hostiles' attention away
from Reno and to him. This, together with the arrival of Benteen at about the same time, probably saved Reno.
While the defensive position Reno and Benteen selected on Reno Hill was better than any Custer would have been able to find where he was, it wasn't all that good. This is,
if the hostiles would have been as determined as white troops in a similiar situation, they would have launched a head-long charge en masse on Reno Hill. And that would have been a Reno-Benteen
Last Stand. But, this would have meant heavy casualties for them, so they were quite content to keep these pony soldiers effectively corraled away from their encampment. Isn't it possible they
would have treated Custer's battalion in the same fashion if he had not made the final troop dispositions he did? Even though he was much closer to their encampment?
Actually, it is evident the hostiles acted almost throughout as defensively as the commanders of the 7th. Most hostile testimony states unequivocally their intention of
not fighting at all. If forced to do so to fight defensively, buying time for their women, children and old people to escape the pony soldiers. While this may be taken with a grain of salt, the
evidence strongly suggests it is true.
In short, the whole Battle of the Little Big Horn was partly a comedy of errors and could have resulted in a draw instead of only that portion of it fought by Reno and
Benteen. There simply wouldn't have been a "Custer's Last Stand" and "Custer's Luck" would not have completely run out. Still, the key to the disaster it did become, was
due to the actions, or rather, the lack thereof of Captain Frederick William Benteen; for whatever reason.
Vendredi 9 mai 2008
The story of Chief Two Moon's nephew
JOHN TWO MOON
AT THE GREASY GRASS
source: Jerome Greene, Lakota and Cheyenne, University
of Oklahoma Press, 1994, pages 46-48, Astonisher; Artwork by Howard Terpning
"After they saw soldiers there, (John) Two Moon, who was nearer to the river on a hillside ran with others and caught
their horses and rushed toward the fight. Several charges had been made but no fighting had been done. Indians were struggling up the gulch northeast of soldiers like ants rushing out of a
hill.
They crowded the company furthest north and they started to run down the ridge. As they got down part way toward the gray horse company the latter began to fire and drove Indians off and the
soldiers reached the gray horse company. Some (soldiers) were kiled, however, when they reached the gray horse (F company). The latter shot at Indains so fast that they drove Indians back out of
sight over hill toward (...).
If these soldiers had all stood together the Indians could have done nothing with them (...) He says that if Custer and Reno had charged through the village from both ends they would have
defeated Indians. "
Dimanche 4 mai 2008
-BOOK REVIEW
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A NEW CLASSIC
Review by custerwest.org member Bill Rini, Moderator of the Little Big Horn Associates Message Board, Indian War Reenactor, and Myles Keogh Living Historian.
A Terrible Glory: Custer and the Little Bighorn - the Last Great Battle of the American West, by James Donovan (Little, Brown and Company, 2008), $17.81
A Terrible Glory by
James Donovan is and excellent read and a wonderful introductory book for the serious student interested in the Indian War period of American History.
I would not call this an introductory book on the Battle of the Little Big Horn, as it is far more than that. It is by far and away the best written and researched book on the overall story
of the battle and the events leading up to it since Son Of The Morning Star by Evan Connell. In fact, I found it to be better written, more
organized and better researched than Connell's book, which was a very pleasant surprise.
An impressive addition to this book is the voluminous endnotes and extensive bibliography whereby the author attempts to reconstruct the battle from numerous first hand sources and
eye-witnesses. In so doing, he is able to unravel many of the controversies and debates that continuously plague the world of 'Custeriana'. The endnotes are detailed and interesting to
read. They add much depth to the story and justification for the authors conclusions. Rarely will one read a history book with such a wealth of information detailed and presented in such an
organized context to enhance the reader's understanding of what happened and why.
There are some minor errors found in the book. At one point, the author refers to James Porter as a 2nd Lieutenant with little or no experience in the 7th Cavalry. In fact, Porter was a 1st
Lieutenant with 6 years of field experience with his regiment. Other minor points mistake Custer's camp on Davis Creek as being 8 miles from the Crow's Nest, whereas it was
closer to half that distance. He also mistakenly identified Custer's battle wounds as being on his right side (p. 276) which he then corrects on p. 308 by mentioning that they were
on his left side. A serious publishing error occurs in Chapter 16's endnotes, several of which are out of order and one missing.
Notwithstanding, these errors for the most part are inconsequential to the understanding of the general public and do not take away from the otherwise excellent research that went into the
writing of this soon to be classic work. The author's reconstruction of the events leading up to the battle, and his insight into the behavior and motivations of
the major characters involved are superb.
His description of the battle itself is very well done and follows closely with the latest research based on Indian accounts and archaeological research. In short,
A Terrible Glory is an excellent and well written narrative on the Battle of the Little Big Horn and well suited for any student of history
who wishes to known more about what happened to Custer at Little Big Horn and why.
James Donovan has written a true masterpiece, a work that places him at the forefront of those who have attempted to tell the tale of this fascinating and complex period of
American History.
A job well done.
BUY THE BOOK NOW! (click on the cover for more informations)
Samedi 3 mai 2008
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The Custer expedition into South Dakota and its aftermath (1874-1876) THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BLACK HILLS sources: Department of Dakota Cavalry Hdqtrs. - Special Orders No. 117 - June 8, 1874; Casey, Robert, The Black Hills, Bobbs-Merrill Publishing, Indianapolis and New York; Lee, Bob, The Black Hills After Custer, Donning Publishers, Virginia Beach, VA, BlackHills |
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The struggle for control of the Black Hills
region is a story in itself. If one were to pick a defining moment in the story of the Black Hills coming under the control of
the United States, it would likely be the Custer Expedition of 1874. “I am inclined to think that the occupation of this region of the country is not necessary to the happiness and prosperity of the Indians, and as it is supposed to be rich in minerals and lumber it is deemed important to have it freed as early as possible from Indian occupancy. I shall, therefore, not oppose any policy which looks first to a careful examination of the subject... If such an examination leads to the conclusion that country is not necessary or useful to Indians, I should then deem it advisable...to extinguish the claim of the Indians and open the territory to the occupation of the whites.” Delano's remarks were in direct contradiction of terms defined in the l868 Laramie Treaty that states: "...no persons except those designated herein ... shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in the territory described in this article." Delano states the major reasons for an exploration in his letter: Americans and representatives in Dakota Territory felt that there was too much land allotted for too few Sioux (estimated to number from 15 to 25,000 in 1872); and the existence of mineral and natural resources in the area. Coincidentally, America entered a period of economic downturn in 1873. It has been widely speculated since that time that the Delano letter and other previous reports and rumors regarding the wealth of the Black Hills brought about the expedition of the following year. General Alfred H. Terry of the Headquarters of the Department of Dakota in St. Paul formally ordered the exploration of the Black Hills on June 8, 1874. Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer was given command of the expedition from Fort Abraham Lincoln, Dakota Territory. The Custer Expedition was given orders to explore the region and evaluate possible sites for a fort in or near the Black Hills.  The expedition departed on
July 2, 1874. The mile-long procession was lead by a buckskin-clad Custer on his favorite bay thoroughbred at the head of ten Seventh Cavalry companies, followed by two
companies of infantry, scouts and guides. The detachment comprised more than l, 000 troops and one black woman, Sarah Campbell, the expedition’s cook. Six-mule teams pulled 110 white
canvas-topped wagons, horse-drawn Gatling guns and cannons, and three hundred head of cattle trailed to provide meat for the troops. A scientific corps included a geologist and his
assistant, a naturalist, a botanist, a medical officer, a topographical engineer, a zoologist, and a civilian engineer. Two miners, Horatio N. Ross and William T. McKay, were attached to
the scientific corps. Custer also brought a photographer, newspaper correspondents, the company’s band, hunting dogs, the son of U. S. President Ulysses S. Grant, as well as his younger
brothers, Tom and Boston.This was not the usual military expedition. The Seventh Cavalry band played for the troops in the mornings as they broke camp and played concerts in the evenings. Troopers leaned from their horses to pick flowers. The large hospital tent served as a dining room for Custer and his staff. Wine bottles visible in Illingworth's photographs indicate they dined in civilized style. |
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In mid-July, the expedition was camped in an open area east of the present town of Custer. Horatio Ross made the initial discovery of gold along French Creek. Custer wasted little time in dispatching the news to Fort Laramie, Wyoming Territory. Bearing the news to the outside world, courier Charley Reynolds made the 115-mile ride to Fort Laramie in four nights, hiding during the day to escape detection by any hostile Indians. From Fort Laramie, Custer's reports were telegraphed to General Terry in St. Paul.  After reading through descriptions of beautiful valleys filled with lush grasses, flowing streams of clear, cold water, wild berries and flowers, Terry finally arrived at the core of the 3,500-word dispatch: “... gold has been found at several places, and it is the belief of those who are giving their attention to this subject that it will be found in paying quantities. I have on my table forty or fifty small particles of pure gold...most of it obtained today from one panful of earth.”
Newspapers in the United States, and around the world, spread the word of the gold discovery by the last week of July. Back at French Creek, Horatio
Ross, 20 men, and Sarah Campbell drew up papers and staked their claim for District No. l, the Custer Mining Company, before the expedition headed north. The expedition explored the
central and northern Black Hills, and then exited the Hills near Bear Butte. |
The U.S. Senate
Commission visited the Nebraska agencies in 1875 to negotiate an outright purchase price for the Black Hills of $6 million. Red Cloud, Spotted Tail (the "agency" chiefs) and Crazy Horse
and the non-settled warriors refused. The Commission also tried to get the chiefs to change the terms of the 1868 Treaty, and to pay the Sioux a $400,000 annual rental to allow safe
passage for the prospectors and settlers. Of course, the chiefs refused this also, and indicated they would protect the Black Hills from this invasion if the U.S. would not honor its
Treaty obligation to do so.
Vendredi 2 mai 2008
Major Reno's incompetence and drunkeness provoked the infamous "charge to the rear" as related here by Private Theodore Goldin
RENO'S DISASTROUS ROUT
source: letter by Theodore F. Goldin to C. T. Brady, August 11, 1904, Astonisher
Little Bighorn, early in the afternoon: after 20 minutes of fighting against 300 warriors, a drunk Major Reno left his men behind in the timber and
rushed to the nearby hills. His line broke and the infamous "charge to the rear" began. No rear guard or attempt of organization was made by Major Reno.
In a private letter, Captain Thomas French, whose company left the timber with organization, wrote that he "should have shot Major Reno" for cowardice. Here is Private Theodore Goldin's account
of this awful rout:
"Lieut. McIntosh had lost his horse and took one belonging to a trooper named McCormick, who gave him up with the remark that we were all dead anyway, and he might as well die dismounted as
mounted. Swinging into the saddle, we moved out of the timber and to our surprise discovered that instead of "charging the Indians" Reno was executing a masterly charge on the bluffs on the
opposite side of the river.
As soon as the Indians discovered this, they massed on our flanks and opened a heavy fire on the retreating column. Fortunately, they were poor marksmen mounted, and our loss was comparatively small at this stage of the stampede, for that is what it was.
It is reported that Reno became so excited that he emptied his revolver at the Indians and then threw the weapon from him. I happen to know this was not so, as the revolver is now in the possession of Gen. Benteen or his family, or was a few years ago.
During the progress of this retreat I was riding on the left of our column and near the timber, and when almost in sight of the river my horse fell, throwing me into a bunch of sage brush, but without doing me serious injury save to exterior cuticle. As I scrambled to my feet Lieut. Wallace passed me, shouting for me to run for the timber as my horse was killed. I did not stop to verify his report, but took his advice, striking only one or two high places between where the horse fell and the timber, which I presently reached.
From where I was concealed I could see our men force their horses into the river and urge them across the boulder-strewn
stream. I saw Lieut. Hodgson's horse leap into the stream and saw him struggling as though wounded, I saw the lieutenant disengage himself from the stirrups and grab the stirrup
strap of a passing trooper and with that aid make his way across the stream. No sooner had he reached the bank than it became apparent he had been wounded, but he pluckily held on, and the
trooper seemed to be trying to help him up behind him on the saddle, but without daring to stop his horse.
An instant later Hodgson seemed to be hit again, for he lost his hold, fell to the ground, staggered to his feet and sought to reach another comrade who reined in to aid him, and just as it
seemed that he was saved I saw the second trooper throw up his arms, reel in the saddle and fall heavily to the ground. Hodgson started to make his way toward the ravine up which the command was
disappearing, he staggered forward a few steps, stumbled, struggled to his feet again, only to fall once more.
He apparently decided that further effort to retreat was useless, as I saw him turn and face the Indians, draw his revolver and open fire. An instant later three or four shots rang out from my
side of the river, and I saw Hodgson reel and fall and I knew it was all over.
In the meantime our men had succeeded in crossing the river and made their way up a neighboring ravine, all save those who had met their fate at the ford, which was one of the worst along the river for many rods. Left alone, I began to wonder what my own fate was likely to be, but I was not observed and therefore not molested, the Indians being busy stripping and mutilating the bodies of our dead along the banks of the stream.
About this time I could hear sounds of heavy firing down the river, and made up my mind that Custer was engaging the
Indians, and from the momentary glimpses I had of the village I felt that he was as badly outnumbered as we were. Most of the Indians in our front melted away and I could see them lashing their
ponies as they hurried to join their friends at the lower end of the village."
Mercredi 30 avril 2008
The exclusive
GUIDE to learn the Indian gospel created by the counter culture
THE INDIAN GOSPEL FOR DUMMIES
by custerwest.org
#1) DESCRIBE THE MAGICAL INNOCENCE
The Indians were infants, sometime violent and incontrollable, but with a magical innocence. They could cut bodies into pieces, rape women, kidnap and murder children, they still are good-looking playboys whose pictures are available everywhere. How about a picture of the Butcher of Minnesota (1’400 civilians murdered), Little Crow (Sioux), in your living-room? So nice!
#2) FIND THE GRIEF
Warning! It is the most important part of the gospel: find the grief. For that purpose, you have a virtual free-hand to seek “answers” through centuries. If Black Kettle’s tribe murdered Clara Blinn, it was probably because they feel angered about the Sand Creek Massacre, four years earlier, or the treaty of Fort Laramie, in 1861, or… well, the arrival of Colombus, in 1492.
#3) STICK TO GENERALITIES
Very important: do not cite names until you have explained the history of the tribe and of all the Indians (and, if you want, even the Aborigines in Australia or Vercingetorix in France). It is very important not to downplay your thesis by saying that only a few characters were involved in the story. Remember that the magical innocence of #1 needs generalities, not specificities. If Black Kettle’s warriors murdered civilians in 1868, call them “Cheyennes”. Or better: “Cheyenne young men”. Or the hit: “angry Cheyenne young men” (hop! you have the link with the grief above.)
#4) REJECT ALL THE REPORTS OF THE ARMY
The prosecutions of your heroic Indians always comes from the army. It is thus very important that you reject their claims with a very natural “of course, the army said that they were guilty!” Because no Indian knew how to write, almost every paper you will find will be written by army officials or the US government. How lovely it is: you can erase all the factual evidence with a few nonchalant words!
#5) MAKE THE INDIAN CUSTOMS THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT
Extremely important: use, and re-use moral relativism and multiculturalism. Make everyone remember that they are Whites and that they cannot – of course! – understand the amazing complexity of these amazing civilizations (do not explain what was amazing about these civilizations, because it will be very hard to find anything gorgeous. Stick to “evident” generalities. "Of course they were amazing!"). Everyone must understand how the tribes worked before "rushing to judgment" (you can also link this “cultural imperative” with the “grief” above). Moreover, you can add that actual American Indians, and nobody else, can understand what the rules are. Make strong conclusions: “If you do not know the rules, how can you condemn them? How can you stick to judeo-christian values when we deal with faaaaaar more complex tribal rules which tolerated mutilations, wife beating, kidnappings or gang rapes?”
#6) DENY ANY KIND OF RESPONSABILITIES
This last argument is linked with the Indian customs above. Deny any kind of individual responsability in any case. More important, deny any collective responsibility. According to the Indian customs, the chiefs could harbor terrorists and be peaceful and feed terrorists and be trustworthy and detain white hostages and be the innocent target of bloodythirsty White men. To get this complete amnesty, the chief just had to claim that he was peaceful. His own words are the most important piece of your defense.
The gospel (finished product):
How could anyone attack a spiritual, good-looking Indian who claimed to be good, who had
no responsibilities whatsoever and whose own tribe was attacked by two Spanish sentinels two centuries before ? Gosh, don't you have any soul?
Mercredi 30 avril 2008
REENACTMENTS
Extract of a documentary on the famous painter Frederic Remington, with footage from Custer's Last Stand reenactments.
Lundi 28 avril 2008
Hunkpapa warchief Low Dog on Custer's Last Stand
LOW DOG'S ACCOUNT
source: William Graham, "The Custer Myth", Stackpole Books, page 75-76. Artworks:
Howard Terpning, WildWest Warts
Sioux Hunkapa warchief Low Dog
(important warchief, known
for his bravery and leadership)
"I was asleep in my lodge at the time. The sun was about noon I heard the alarm, but I did not believe it. I thought it was a false alarm. I did not think it possible that any white men would
attack us, so strong as we were. We had in camp the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and seven different tribes of the Teton Sioux -- a countless number.
Although I did not believe it was a true alarm, I lost no time getting ready. When I got my gun and came out of my lodge the attack had begun at the end of the camp where Sitting Bull and the
Unkpapas were.
The Indians held their ground to give the women and children time to get out of the way. By this time the herders were driving in the horses and as I was nearly at the further end of the camp, I
ordered my men to catch their horses and get out of the way, and my men were hurrying to go and help those that were fighting. When the fighters saw that the women and children were safe they
fell back. By this time my people went to help them, and the less able warriors and the women caught horses and got them ready, and we drove the first attacking party back, and that party
retreated to a high hill.
Then I told my people not to venture too far in pursuit for fear of falling into an ambush. By this time all the warriors in our camp were mounted and ready for fight, and then we were attacked
on the other side by another party. They came on us like a thunderbolt. I never before nor since saw men so brave and fearless as those white warriors. We retreated until our men got all
together, and then we charged upon them.
I called to my men, "This is a good day to die: follow me." We massed our men, and that no man should fall back, every man whipped another man's horse and we rushed right upon them. (...)
They held their horses reins on one arm while they were shooting, but their horses were so frightened that they pulled the men all around, and a great many of their shots went up in the air and
did us no harm.
The white warriors stood their ground bravely, and none of them made any attempt to get away. After all but two of them were killed, I captured two of their horses. Then the wise men and chiefs
of our nation gave out to our people not to mutilate the dead white chief, for he was a brave warrior and died a brave man, and his remains should be respected.
"Then I turned around and went to help fight the other white warriors, who had retreated to a high hill on the east side of the river
(Reno). I don't know whether any white men of Custer's force were taken prisoners. When I got back to our camp they were all dead. Everything was in confusion all the time of the fight. I did not
see Gen. Custer. I do not know who killed him. We did not know till the fight was over that he was the white chief. We had no idea that the white warriors were coming until the runner came in and
told us.
(...) If Reno and his warriors had fought as Custer and his warriors fought, the battle might have been against us. No white man or Indian
ever fought as bravely as Custer and his men."
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"Reno proved incompetent and Benteen showed
his indifference – I will not use the uglier words that have often been in my mind. Both failed Custer and he had to fight it out alone."
Little Bighorn veteran William Taylor, 02/20/1910
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