Another myth of the Little Bighorn 

CUSTER AND 
TULLOCKS CREEK

source: Colonel William Graham, The Custer Myth, page 131

In the movie "Son of the Morning Star", as well as in many articles and books, it is said that Custer neglected to scout Tullocks Creek and gave therefore a proof that he wanted to speed his regiment up and gain a victory for himself.

Scouting Tullocks Creek was noted in General Terry's orders:

"The Department Commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should thoroughly examine the upper part of Tullock's Creek"

Did Custer neglect this order? No. Tullocks Creek had his full attention.

Lieutenant Godfrey: "The march during the day was tedious. We made many long halts, so as not to get ahead of the scouts, who seemed to be doing their work thoroughly, giving special attention to the right, toward Tulloch's Creek, the valley of which was in general view from the divide. Once or twice signal smokes were reported in that direction, but investigation did not confirm the reports."

The "Tullocks Creek controversy" was another hoax to push the "Custer the Reckless commander" agenda.

Three columns had to hunt Indians in 1876. But George Crook's 1'300 soldiers lost ten men at the battle of the Rosebud and then fell back to... go fishing on the Yellowston river.
GEORGE CROOK'S DUTY
Mary Trotter Kion, Suite101 


Two major battles took place in the west during June of 1876. The latter fight was the Battle of the Little Bighorn where Custer met his demise.

 The first battle took place along the banks of the upper Rosebud.

 General George Crook was the leading star of this show with some 1000 troops (1'300 with the scouts, n. custerwest). That sounds like a fairly reasonable number of men to insure a success over a band of Indians, and well it might have been. But Crook made a major error early on. He split his forces, sending one half on their merry way downstream along the Rosebud to locate and destroy a Cheyenne village believed to be camped in the area.

This tactic might have been successful except while one half of Crook’s forces were attacking the Indian village an even larger group of Cheyenne and Sioux attack Crook’s camp (Crazy Horse's men, the ones who would battle Custer one week later, n. custerwest). It didn’t take Crook long to realize that he was not only out-numbered (He was not. There were 750 warriors, n. custerwest), but also out flanked. Escape back to their base camp at Big Goose Creek became the plan of the day in no time at all for Crook and his men (casualties: 10 dead, 21 wounded. Indians didn't control the battlefield, n. custerwest).

Since Crook’s men failed to win a victory over the Indians it was decide to take on a lesser foe—the fish that were camped in Big Goose Creek. For two weeks, during which time the Battle of the Little Bighorn raged and was lost, Crook’s men counted coup on a band of trout.

Crook’s men had done a little fishing in this creek prior to being bested at Rosebud, but now the angling began in earnest. Records were kept of the amounts of fish caught and the methods for catching them by Crook’s aid de camp Captain John Bourke. It seems that artificial flies and fishing lines that had been brought in personal kits were used by the men. There is no mention of bamboo rods or fishing reels being used. The record amount of fish caught in any given day was claimed by Captain Anson Mills with 146 trout taken the same day Generals Gibbon and Terry were rescuing survivors of the Little Bighorn.

Also recorded was the weather. It is noted by the source of this article, recorded below, that the same hot weather that bloated the bodies left at the Battle of the Little Bighorn also brought on an extreme hatch of grasshoppers in Wyoming. In addition, the Indians who decamped after the Little Bighorn affair, while heading back to the Black Hills, set fire to the prairie. The fire drove the grasshoppers before it, right towards Goose Creek. This invasion got the attention of the trout and provided a profusion of live bate for the angling soldiers. 

Up to this point flyfishing had met with mild success, then the fish only had eyes for the grasshoppers, refusing any artificial inducements to take the bite.

While the soldiers fished some 100 Shoshone warriors who had come over from Wind River country to count coups on their Cheyenne and Sioux enemies hung around and watched. After a while the Shoshone offered to show the soldiers how this catching of fish should be done—on horseback.

The Indians piled brush across the creek, making a sort of weir. A few Indians stayed there while some half-dozen rode downstream. From that point they suddenly came charging up the creek, abreast and lashing the water with coup sticks and lances.

To the amazement of the soldiers, hundreds of trout fled upstream until the brush damn halted their flight. Now it was a simple matter of plucking the fish from the water and flinging them up on the bank.

And that, a Shoshone informed Bourke, was how real men caught fish. 

VARNUM: THE LAST MORNING

source: The Custer Myth by Colonel W.A. Graham, pages 342 - 343

Lieutenant Charles Varnum was the chief of scouts at the Little Bighorn. Here is one of his personal letter, written on July 4, 1876., about the morning before the battle. 

Early on the morning of the third day (June 25, 1876), we got on a very heavy trail going up the Rosebud. About ten miles from camp we found a circle surrounded by a brush fence arranged for a sun-dance, a description of which I have given you before, for making warriors. We found a stick with a fresh scalp attached and the trail of two or three Indians, evidently made that morning. We marched twenty miles, and then I was sent back six to examine a creek to see if any Indians had left the trail, and on my return we started again and made eight miles more, and camped in an Indian camp about two days old. The signs indicated an immense force, and we were in a hurry to take them by surprise. Custer came over to see the scouts. Six Crows with us, who knew the country well, said that the trail from here led on towards the Little Horn, a fork of the Bighorn, and they wanted to go ahead about twenty miles to a high bluff from which the valley of the Little Horn could be seen. Custer wanted some intelligent white man to go ahead with them to send him information. I took the six Crows, five Rees, and a white man, who was an old frontiersman, and we marched all night, making about sixty miles. I had rode without rest or any sleep for thirty-six hours. 
 
Custer said he would start at 11 p. m., and come somewhere near us by morning. At 2:30 o'clock we reached the hill, and lay there in scrub bushes until daybreak, when we discovered the smoke of a village, and by 5 a. m., I started the Rees back with a dispatch to General Custer. The Crows said there were about two or three thousand ponies on the plain twelve miles off, but I could not see them, as their eyes were better than mine. Custer had come ahead, and we could see his camp about eight miles off. He got my dispatch at 8 a. m., and started again and came to the hill. In the meantime two Sioux were seen going in the direction of Custer's column. Charley Reynolds, myself, the Crow interpreter and two Crows started out to kill them, and prevent Custer being discovered. We failed to do it, however, and when Custer came up we informed him of the state of affairs, and he concluded, as we were discovered, to hurry up and strike them as soon as possible.

LITTLE BIGHORN CAMPAIGN

WHAT THE SCOUTS 
REALLY SAID  
Wonderful artwork by Michael Schreck, http://michaelschreckart.com

In the traditional account of the battle, one depicts Indian scouts warning Custer of a suicidal attack.

In fact, it never happened that way. It is a myth, built by Benteen and Reno to cover their own actions and to make US people believe that the battle was impossible. Nobody would ask why they didn't support Custer.

In fact, when the Indian scouts saw the village on Crows Nest, several miles away from the hostile village, they told Custer of their discovery. Custer told them to wait until the night, to begin an attack on June 26, as it was planned. But Indian scouts suddenly saw Sioux scouts on the hills and told Custer that he had been discovered.

Custer was angry. He didn't want to attack in the afternoon, and told the scouts that nobody had seen them. White Man Runs Him and the Crow scouts told him to attack at once. Red Star remembered that the Crow wanted to attack, but Custer didn't want to.

But soon afterwards, Captain Keogh told Custer that Indians had discovered a breadbox that had been forgotten by the pack mule.

Custer then decided to attack at once. He told his officers that he had wanted to attack at dawn, on June 26, 1876, but that the Indian discovery was endangering the whole mission. The attack had to be made at once.

Custer's attack wasn't impossible, as some people continue to say today. It was logical. US general-in-chief Nelson A. Miles, while studying the battle between 1877 and 1890 with White and Indian witnesses and his own experience as an Indian fighter, didn't see any problem in attacking Indians at Little Bighorn.

The lack of organization of the warriors weakened their force. 1'500 warriors wasn't big deal for 647 soldiers with training and long-range rifles (Indians loved short-range rifles, to shoot while riding).

This is the key to understand Little Bighorn. It was NOT a suicidal attack. Not at all.

But 210 soldiers with Cusetr's column fought during the whole battle (June 25, 1876). 400 others with Benteen and Reno didn't fight much, 40 minutes for 170 of them, and no more than 10 minutes for the majority with Benteen. 

How could that happen ?

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